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the primary flaw in this decision is its failure clearly to draw the line between
allowable and prohibited product picketing and to delineate some standards
which would guide this determination in situations where the struck product
comprises less than all of the secondary employer's business. It would seem
that by allowing product picketing of a multiproduct secondary employer but
not of a single-product secondary employer that the standard for determining
the allowability of such product picketing is the nature of the secondary em-
ployer's business and the possible economic impact thereon. Still undetermined
by this decision is the situation where the union pickets products comprising
80 percent of the secondary employer's business. In such a case, the union is
not requesting customers to boycott the entire business, only 80 percent. Yet
the possible loss of 80 percent of one's business necessarily coerces the sec-
ondary employer to cooperate with the union and cease dealing with the
primary employer. Again even if the picketed products comprise 70 percent,
or 60 percent, or 50 percent of the secondary employer's business, the question
still remains: where to draw the line and on what basis. The present case
presents the first limitation on the Tree Fruits product-picketing privilege.
Only future Board and court opinions will determine the ultimate extent of
this privilege with the only apparent test being whether, in the context of
each case, the picketing is in the nature of secondary restraint and coercion.
PETER A. AMBROSINI
Labor Law—Labor Management Relations Act—Section 14(c)—State
Court Jurisdiction over Labor Dispute.—Stryjewski v. Local 830,
Brewery & Beer Distrib. Drivers. 1—Plaintiff beer distributor is a Pennsyl-
vania business concern composed of husband and wife. Under existing business
conditions, plaintiff purchased its supply of beer from an "importing distrib-
utor," who imported beer from outside the state. A Teamsters Union affiliate,
which had a collective-bargaining contract with some importing distributors,
picketed the plaintiff's premises. The purposes of the picketing, according to
the union, were to advertise the fact that plaintiff was nonunion and to at-
tempt to organize plaintiff's employees. Because employees of the importing
distributors would not cross the picket line to make deliveries to the plaintiff,
the picketing precluded all shipments of beer supplies from those distributors.
Plaintiff did not, initially, seek relief from the National Labor Relations Board.
Instead, it brought suit in the local court of common pleas against the union
seeking damages and asking for injunctive relief to restrain the picketing. After
a hearing, the court refused to issue a preliminary injunction on the ground
that the matters at issue were arguably within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NLRB.2
Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Central to the
controversy was Section 14(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act? This
1 426 Pa. 512, 233 A.2d 264 (1967).
2 Id. at 515, 233 A.2d at 266.
a 29 U.S.C. 164(c) (1964). This section states:
(c) (1) The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by pub-
lished rules adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, decline to
800
CASE NOTES
provision was added in 1959 to allow state tribunals to take jurisdiction in
labor disputes when the NLRB declines to assert its statutory jurisdiction be-
cause of the lack of substantial impact on commerce. The Pennsylvania court
was willing to assume, arguendo, that the NLRB would, if the dispute were
presented to it, refuse jurisdiction for the two reasons advanced by the plain-
tiff: (1) the only employee was the son of the husband and wife who oper-
ated the plaintiff business; 4 (2) plaintiff's annual gross sales were only
$230,000 . 6 The state supreme court, nevertheless, affirmed the lower court's
decree. HELD: A state court must decline jurisdiction in a labor dispute
affecting commerce when, at the time of the hearing in the state court, the
NLRB has not actually declined to assert jurisdiction in the particular con-
troversy involved. In reaching this conclusion, the majority treated as irrele-
vant the fact that, since the hearing below, the Board had specifically declined
to take jurisdiction in this labor dispute. 6
Chief Justice Bell and Justice Roberts filed separate dissenting opinions.
Chief Justice Bell felt that the lower court should have issued the injunction.
He pointed out that there was not the slightest doubt that the NLRB would
refuse jurisdiction in this labor dispute, and emphasized that the plaintiff
would be forced out of business by this picketing if it had to wait for relief
until the Board had gone through the formality of specifically declining juris-
diction. Justice Roberts argued that section 14(c) allows a state to take
jurisdiction when it is "obvious" that the NLRB will decline jurisdiction in
the case, and that the plaintiff had fulfilled its burden of showing that the
NLRB would decline to assert jurisdiction over this labor dispute.? He felt
that, on this basis, the state court should have considered the arguments on
the merits as to the preliminary injunction.
The majority of the Pennsylvania court has adopted, in this case, a re-
assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or category of em-
ployers, where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on
commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction:
Provided, That the Board shall not decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor
dispute over which it would assert jurisdiction under the standards prevailing
upon August 1, 1959.
(2) Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency
or the courts of any State or Territory ... from assuming and asserting jurisdic-
tion over labor disputes over which the Board declines, pursuant to paragraph
(1) of this subsection, to assert jurisdiction.
4 Section 2(3) of the LMRA excludes from the definition of "employee" "any in-
dividual employed by his parent or spouse." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964). The plaintiff
contended that, by virtue of this section of the Act, the NLRB has refused to accept juris-
diction in a labor dispute between a union and an employer, such as the plaintiff, where
the only employee is a son of said employer. Brief for Appellant at 6, 7, 426 Pa. 512, 233
A.2d 264 (1967).
5 The NLRB has applied a jurisdictional standard under which it asserts jurisdiction
over retail enterprises only if they fall within the Board's statutory jurisdiction and have
an annual gross volume of business of at least $500,000. Carolina Supplies & Cement Co.,
122 N.L.R.B. 88 (1958). It was argued that plaintiff's gross volume of $230,000 was clearly
less than the required $500,000. Brief for Appellant at 9, 426 Pa. 512, 233 A.2d 264 (1967).
426 Pa. at 517 n.9, 233 A.2d at 267 n.9. The Pennsylvania court stressed that only
the facts existing at the time of the hiaring on the petition for a preliminary injunction
were relevant to its decision in the principal case.
7 426 Pa. at 523, 233 Aid at 270.
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quirement which has significant procedural consequences in the area of fed-
eral-state relations. Pursuant to its power to decline jurisdiction over labor
disputes if the effect on commerce is not sufficiently substantial, the Board
has announced certain jurisdictional standards. 8 The effect of the Pennsyl-
vania decision is to require a litigant to go to the NLRB for an interpretation
and application of those standards even in the instances where the facts clearly
indicate that the jurisdictional requirements set out by the Board are not sat-
isfied.
The principal case is of further significance in that it is inconsistent with
a number of prior state court decisions. The majority opinion expressly re-
jected° the approach taken by the California Supreme Court in Russell v.
Electrical Workers Local 569.10 The California court held, in that case, that a
state tribunal may make the initial adjudication as to whether it should take
jurisdiction in a labor dispute under section 14(c). This adjudication is to be
accomplished by deciding whether the facts of the case place it within the
jurisdictional guidelines already announced by the NLRB. 11 There is further
state authority which, although not specifically rejected by the Pennsylvania
court, is certainly inconsistent with the Stryjewski rule. In a number of cases,
state tribunals have applied the Board's standards in adjudicating the jurisdic-
tional issue, without considering explicitly whether state action should await
the Board's refusal to assert jurisdiction in the particular case. 12 In view of
these differences among the states at the present time,13 and in view of the
8 One example of these jurisdictional standards is set out at note 5 supra. That stan-
dard for retailers was announced on October 2, 1958. 23 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 8 (1958).
9 426 Pa. at 525-26, 233 A.2d at 267-68.
m 64 Cal. 2d 22, 409 P.2d 926, 48 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1966), noted in 80 Marv. L. Rev.
1600 (1967).
11 The court states explicitly that "Isiection 14(c) does not require prior application
to the board; plaintiff need only demonstrate that the hoard would decline to hear the
case. Plaintiff may show such declination by the board on the basis of published rules
and the rules of decision to which Congress referred in section 14(c)." 64 Cal. 2d at 25,
409 P.2d at 928, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
12 Continental Slip Form Builders, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Constr. & Gen. Labor,
Local 1290, 193 Kan. 459, 393 P.41 1004 (1964); Local 227, Amalgamated Meat Cutters
v. Fleischaker, 384 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1964); Smith v. Noel, 24 Ohio Op. 2d 159, 188 N.E.2d
195 (C.P. 1963) ; Mr. Snow Man, Inc., 46 L.R.R.M. 1375 (N.Y. Lab. Relations Bd. 1960).
13 The majority in Stryjewski refers to the case of Colorado State Council of Car-
ynters v. District Ct. of Larimer County, 155 Colo. 54, 392 P.2d 601 (1964). Although
the Pennsylvania court suggests that the decision in the Colorado case conflicts with the
rule adopted in the Russell case and supports the result in Stryjewski, that analysis of
the Colorado case is questionable. The Colorado court does not indicate at any point that
it is confronted with an issue of whether a state court may take jurisdiction in the ab-
sence of an actual declination by the Board in each case. Although the court states the
very general principle that the state court may not enjoin peaceful picketing until the
NLRB declines jurisdiction in a controversy, id. at 56, 392 P.2d at 601-02, it does not
specify the manner in which the Board must first decline jurisdiction. In effect, the Colo-
rado court seems to be concerned with a situation in which the lower state court took
jurisdiction of the labor controversy despite the fact that the NLRB clearly had jurisdic-
tion of the dispute under its existing standards. It is submitted that such a decision is not
authority for the result in Stryjewski. The •principal case is concerned with whether. a
state court may interpret and apply the Board's jurisdictional standards and take juris-
diction if they are not satisfied, rather than with the question whether a state court can
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procedural importance that attaches to the Pennsylvania decision to require
actual declination by the Board, it is appropriate to consider the validity of
the Stryjewski approach to section 14(c).
The court in Stryjewski does not develop at length the rationale behind
its decision. Rather, it states simply that if the state courts are allowed to in-
terpret and apply the Board's jurisdictional standards, it is clear that such
cases "will present many variables and a resolution of such variables by the
state courts, in the absence of a declination to act by the NLRB, may well
result in a chaotic situation which will harm the national labor policy.""
Essential to an understanding of this brief statement of the rationale is
an examination of the policy behind the application of the preemption doc-
trine to labor disputes which are within the scope of the LMRA. The Supreme
Court has stressed that most aspects of labor disputes affecting commerce are
not subject to state regulation. Specifically, those activities which are "ar-
guably subject" to Sections 7 or 8 of the LMRA are to be referred to the "ex-
clusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board." 15 The basis for
this doctrine is found in an earlier preemption case, in which the Supreme
Court described the congressional policy underlying the LMRA as follows:
Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be en-
forced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the
parties. It went on to confide primary interpretation and application
of its rules to a specific and specially constituted tribunal Con-
gress evidently considered that centralized administration of spe-
cially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform applica-
tion of its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and
conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and atti-
tudes toward labor controversies. 16
This strict doctrine of federal preemption was altered by section 14(c)
which expresses tolerance of the diversity that is likely to accompany state
regulation of those labor disputes in which the NLRB has declined to assert
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in view of the policy behind the development of the
preemption doctrine in labor cases, it is not surprising that the Pennsylvania
court reached a decision requiring actual declination. It is arguable that, in
order to effectuate the congressional policy of uniformity in the application of
the national act, it is appropriate to have the federal labor agency itself de-
termine, in every labor dispute within the scope of the LMRA, whether it will
assume jurisdiction. In effect, the actual declination rule would avoid the
"diversities and conflicts" incident to state application of NLRB jurisdictional
standardsn in the same way that the preemption doctrine mentioned above
grant relief once it is dear that the controversy falls within the jurisdictional realm of the
NLRB.
14 426 Pa. at 519, 233 A.2d at 268. 	 •
15 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
16 Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953).
17 A typical situation in which diverse interpretations of NLRB standards might
occur is found in Cox's Food Center, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 1653, 420 P.2d 645
(Idaho 1966). In that case, the state court was confronted with the issue whether the
Board's jurisdictional standard for retailers, discussed note 5 supra, should apply to. the
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insures "unifOrm application" of the substantive rules contained in the federal
labor act.
In addition to the above rationale, there is another factor to be consid-
ered in'weighing the merits of the Stryjewski interpretation of section 14(c).
An advisory-opinion procedure has been established by the Board in a series
of promulgated rules. 18 Basically, those rules provide that any party to a labor
dispute or any state agency or court may obtain an opinion on whether the
Board would assert jurisdiction over the particular labor dispute pending be-
fore such court or agency. It has been suggested that the adoption of this
procedure is an indication of the NLRB's view that the question of jurisdic-
tion of state courts or agencies under section 14(c) is one which the Board,
itself, will decide in each case." If this is, in fact, the Board's view of section
14(c), such a factor deserves considerable attention because of the NLRB's
position as expert interpreter of the LMRA. -
Even if an actual declination rule is the most effective means of achieving
national uniformity in the administration of the LMRA, and even if the
NLRB's establishment of its advisory-opinion procedure tends to indicate its
acceptance of such a rule, there remains serious doubt as to the merits or
necessity of the Stryjewski interpretation of section 14(c)." A decision as to
calendar year preceding the year in which the labor dispute started or to the twelve-month
period immediately preceding the retailer's commencement of legal action to obtain re-
lief. In the absence of an explicit resolution of this question by the NLRB, it is certainly
arguable that the states would take different positions on that issue in determining
whether the state court or the NLRB is the proper forum for the labor dispute in ques-
tion.
18 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.39-.43, 102.98-.110 (1967). In addition to providing for the
rendering by the Board of advisory opinions, the Board's regulations allow the personnel
of regional offices to render informal opinions on jurisdictional issues. The regulations point
out, however, that the information and advice obtained in this latter fashion are not
binding on the Board.
19 Goldberg Si Meiklejohn, Title VII: Taft-Hartley Amendments, with Emphasis on
the Legislative History, 54 Nw. U.L. Rev. 747, 753 (1960). But see Comment, Federal
Pre-Emption and Section 701 of the Taft-Hartley Amendment, 37 U. Det. L.J. 400, 408
(1960).
20 Although the legislative history of § 14(c) is hardly conclusive on this question,
it has been suggested that an actual declination rule is "inconsistent with the general tone
of Congressional discussion" of that section. Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to
the National Labor Relations Act, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 257, 262 (1959). The fact that Pro-
fessor Cox was chairman of an advisory panel that worked very closely with the con-
gressional committees in the task of revising the LMRA adds weight to this opinion. 105
Cong. Rec. 17,867 (1959).
An example of that congressional discussion, which was hardly consonant with the
result in Stryjewski, is found in the remarks of Representative Griffin. Speaking on behalf
of the proposed § 14(c), he stressed that the Board would be authorized to decline juris-
diction "either by rule of decision or by published rules." He then stated that state courts
or agencies would have "authority to exercise jurisdiction over such classes of cases as
the Board has declined or would decline." 105 Cong. Rec. 14,347 (1959) (emphasis
added). The emphasized language certainly seems inconsistent with an actual declination
rule.
There is, however, one aspect of the legislative history of § 14(c) which is favorable
to the Stryjewski result. During the Senate debate on the 1959 Amendments to the LMRA,
Senator Morse pointed out that the proposed § 14(c) (2) was ambiguous. He noted, how-
ever, that there was only one appropriate way to read that section. He stated that "it is
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whether the Board must decline jurisdiction in each case before a state may
take jurisdiction under sectionl4(c) should be preceded by serious considera-
tion of the problems created by the preemption cases and the effect which section
14(c) was designed to have upon those problems. It should be noted that one
significant preemption case created a remedial "no man's land" by holding
that state courts could not take jurisdiction over labor disputes subject to the
LMRA even in those situations where the NLRB had specifically declined to
assert jurisdiction because of insufficient impact on commerce?' As a result
of this case, there were labor disputes in which the parties would have no
remedy. To correct that situation, section 14(c) was adopted to provide ap-
propriate forums for those in the "no man's land." 22 A question arises as to
how an actual declination rule fits into this context of legislative action. It has
been suggested that the relief which section 14(c) was supposed to provide
could be limited significantly by the delay involved in petitioning the NLRB,
in every instance, to take jurisdiction. 23 In a similar vein, another commen-
tator has pointed out that the alternative view, which would allow the state
courts to interpret and apply the Board's jurisdictional standards, does appear
to be in keeping with the "legislative purpose of providing a forum which
could give prompt remedial action in the no-man's land." 21
Like Chief Justice Bell dissenting in Stryjewski, 25 the above writers show
an awareness that, when a labor dispute flares up, relief often must be swift in
order to be effective. At least in those instances where it is clear that the
Board's jurisdictional standards are not met, section 14 (c)'s purpose of mak-
ing legal relief available to those in the "no man's land" would seem to be
effectuated more fully by allowing the state court to decide in the first in-
stance whether it has jurisdiction than by requiring deferral to the NLRB.
The approach which allows the state court to determine whether the
Board's jurisdictional standards are met finds some support in two recent Su-
preme Court decisions. In Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local
only after the Board determines that it should decline to exercise jurisdiction in a partic-
ular dispute that the state court is to be given the authority to assume and assert its juris-
diction." 105 Cong. Rec. 17,877 (1959). In effect, then, Senator Morse was interpreting the
language, which was to he enacted at § 14(c), as requiring actual declination by the NLRB
in every case.
Shortly after the 1959 amendments were enacted, several commentators joined Morse
in his concern about the ambiguity of the language in § 14(c). They noted that it was not
clear whether that section requires an actual declination by the Board in each instance.
DeJarmon, Labor and Small Business--Uniformity or Confusion, 1 B.C. Ind. & Com. L.
Rev. 175, 178-80 (1960); Hardbeck, Federal-State Jurisdictional Issues and Policies Under
the New Labor Law, 12 Lab L J 99, 105 (1961) ; Comment, Section 70I (a) of the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 587, 594-95
(1960).
21 Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
22 See McCold, Notes on a "G-String": A Study of the "No Man's Land" of Labor
Law, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 205, 230-37 (1959).
22 Comment, Labor Law—Federal and State Jurisdiction—No Man's Land and
Section 701(a), 6 Vill. L. Rev. 80, 85 (1960).
24 Merrifield, Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations Law, 29 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 318, 329 (1960).
25 426 Pa. at 519, 233 A.2d at 269.
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1264 v. Broadcast Serv. of Mobile, Inc. 26 and in Hattiesburg Bldg. & Trades
Council v. Broome," the Court was faced with situations in which state courts
had interpreted the NLRB's jurisdictional standards and had assumed juris-
diction on the basis that those standards were not met. The Court reversed
both cases in per curiam opinions. However, the court made no suggestion that
the NLRB must, in fact, decline jurisdiction in each case prior to the state
court's assumption of jurisdiction. Rather, the Court based its decisions on
the errors in the state courts' application of the Board standards. 28 In fact, in'
the Local 1264 case, the Supreme Court made a significant statement indicat-
ing acceptance of state court interpretation and application of the NLRB's
jurisdictional standards. After having stated the reasons put forth by the state
court in asserting jurisdiction, the Court stated: "Although a state court may
assume jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the National Labor Rela-
tions Board has, but declines to assert, jurisdiction, ... there must be a proper
determination of whether the case is actually one of those which the Board will
decline to hear."2° It should be noted that this statement immediately precedes
the Court's discussion of the errors in the state court's treatment of the NLRB
jurisdictional standards. It is submitted that this context makes it clear that
the "proper determination" of whether the NLRB will take jurisdiction may
be performed by state courts and agencies.
A reading of the exact language in section 14(c) casts further doubt on
the correctness of the holding in Stryjewski. Subsection ( I) of the provision
explicitly allows the Board to decline to assert jurisdiction "by rule of decision
or by published rules." 3° (Emphasis added.) If Congress intended that the
Board must, in fact, decline jurisdiction in each case before the state tribunal
would have jurisdiction, it seems apparent that the single phrase, "by rule of
decision," would have been sufficient to convey that intent. Congress, however,
included an alternate method by which the NLRB could decline jurisdiction.
Since the statute does provide two methods, it is arguable that by requiring an
actual declination by the Board in every case, the Pennsylvania court is strip-
ping the meaning and effectiveness from that portion of the statute which
allows the NLRB to decline jurisdiction "by published rules." 31
The arguments in favor of an actual declination rule are not persuasive in
light of the above considerations. The legislative policy behind section 14(c),
the recent Supreme Court cases, and the statutory language all suggest a result
contrary to the rule adopted by the Stryjewski court.32 Nevertheless, the
26 380 U.S. 255 (1965).
37 377 U.S. 126 (1963).
'28 In the Local 1264 case, the Court pointed out that the state court had failed to
take into consideration the Board's practice of treating several nominally separate business
entities as a single employer where they constitute, in fact, a single, integrated concern.
380 U.S. at 256-57. In the Hattiesburg case, the Court noted that the state court had
failed to consider that, where secondary picketing is involved, it is the practice of the
Board to hold that its jurisdictional standards may be satisfied by reference to the busi-
ness operations of either the primary or secondary employer. 377 U.S. at 126-27.
29 380 U.S. at 256.
39 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1) (1964).
37 See Russell v. Electrical Workers Local 569, 64 Cal. 2d 22, 25, 409 P.2d 926, 928,
48 Cal. Rptr. 702, 704 (1966).
32 It should be pointed out that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could have avoided
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Pennsylvania court has, quite appropriately, called attention to the undesire-
ability of diverse state interpretations of NLRB jurisdictional standards—
especially in view of the policy of uniformity underlying the LMRA. It is
submitted, however, that the facts of the Stryjewski case would hardly give
rise to variant interpretations of the Board's standards. The simple, basic
facts were that the employer's gross sales amounted to $230,000, the picket-
ing was not secondary, 33 and the Board's jurisdictional standard for retailers
is $500,000 in gross volume. In such clear and uncomplicated fact situations,
where differences in the states' applications of Board standards would be un-
likely, an actual declination rule is hardly necessary to avoid the diversity
which the Pennsylvania court fears.
The question remains whether there is a feasible alternative to the Penn-
sylvania rule which will guard against divergent state applications of Board
standards, and yet will avoid the useless formality of having the NLRB de-
cline to assert jurisdiction when the labor dispute is clearly outside of the
Board's jurisdictional standards. In line with the California rule, adopted in
the Russell case, it is suggested that a state court should be allowed to decide
whether the labor dispute is within the Board's standards. However, that ap-
proach should be qualified by judicial direction to lower courts or to the
parties themselves to defer to the NLRB in those troublesome situations
where it is not clear from past decisions and rules what the Board's decision
would be as to the assertion of jurisdiction." At least one state court, showing
its adoption of the actual declination rule by treating the jurisdictional issue as moot.
This alternative was available because the central issue facing the court was whether the
NLRB must decline jurisdiction in this specific case before the state court could assume
jurisdiction, and in the interim since the decision of the court below, the NLRB had re-
fused to take jurisdiction in this particular labor dispute. In effect then, both parties were
aware that there could now be no doubt that the state courts were open to them, whether
or not the actual declination rule was the proper approach to § 14(c). In this state of
affairs, the court's decision that such an approach would be adopted amounted to an
advisory opinion for the benefit of future litigants. There is authority that suggests the
impropriety of such judicial action and states that the jurisdictional issue should be treated
as moot on facts similar to those in Stryjewski. Bowlavar, Inc. v. Local 90, General Team
& Truck Drivers, 252 Iowa 851, 109 N.W.2d 22 (1961).
33 When the NLRB decided that its jurisdictional standards could be satisfied by
reference to the operations of both the primary and the secondary employers in a labor
dispute involving a secondary boycott, it also stated the fundamental characteristics of
the secondary activity which would give rise to the application of that approach to its
assertion of jurisdiction. The Board explained that, "[bly its very nature the effect of a
secondary boycott extends beyond the operations of the primary employer with which
the union is engaged in a dispute, and reaches the secondary employers whom the union
is attempting to force or require to cease dealing with the primary employer by means
prescribed [sic] in Section 8 (b) (4)." Truck Drivers Local 649, 93 N.L.R.B. 386, 387
(1951). The facts of the principal case present no such secondary activity. There is no
mention in the briefs of the parties nor in the opinion of the court that the picketing at
plaintiff's place of business was in support of a primary dispute with the importing dis-
tributors. Rather, the only apparent dispute is between the Teamsters Union affiliate and
the plaintiff beer distributor. There is, therefore, no need to look beyond the plaintiff's
annual gross volume of $230,000.
34 In deferring to the Board's specific determination as to whether it will assert
jurisdiction over the labor dispute, the usual procedure of filing charges or seeking cer-
tification could be followed. As an alternative, the advisory-opinion procedure could be
utilized by courts or parties in order to ascertain whether the NLRB would assert juris-
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an admirable awareness of the federal system regulating labor disputes, has fol-
lowed such an approach by instructing a lower court to seek an advisory
opinion where it was not clear what the Board's decision would be. 3 's Such an
approach achieves the two-fold objective set out above and assimilates de-
sirable aspects of both the Pennsylvania and the California rules.
WILLIAM A. RYAN, JR.
Labor Law—Railway Labor Act—Carrier's Duty to Bargain During
a Representation Dispute.—Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters 1—In 1946, the Brotherhood of Railway Airline
Clerks (BRAC) 2 was certified by the National Mediation Board (NMB) as
the collective-bargaining agent for the clerical and related employees of Pan
American World Airways, Inc. (Pan Am). Several collective-bargaining
agreements were executed between the carrier and the union, the last of which
became effective January 1, 1965, and was to continue in effect until March
16, 1967, or thereafter, unless notice of intended change were given 30 days
prior to March 16, or any date thereafter.
In August, 1965, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT)
filed a petition with the NMB claiming to represent a majority of the clerical
employees at Pan Am. The NMB ordered a representation election, but the
BRAC refused to allow its name to appear on the ballot; taking the position
that the IBT's failure to obtain more than 50 percent of the eligible votes
would leave the BRAC as bargaining agent.° This first election was set aside
by the NMB before it was completed, when the BRAC called the Board's
attention to fraudulent practices in the campaign. Another election was
ordered, and the BRAC again refused to appear on the ballot. The IBT won
diction over the particular labor dispute. However, there has been some comment that
takes a pessimistic view toward the practical success of the latter procedure. Aaron, The
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Ham L. Rev. 1086, 1096
(1960). The writer suggests that state courts and agencies are hardly apt to defer to the
opinions from the NLRB when those courts and agencies are deciding the question of
their jurisdiction to give relief in a labor dispute.
In one recent case a judge displayed the attitude that Professor Aaron anticipated.
Dissenting in Cox's Food Center, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 1653, 420 P.2d 645 (Idaho
1966), the judge stated that "the majority improperly dilutes the judicial authority of the
district court below in directing that it seek the Board's advisory opinion ......Id. at
659. The dissenter adds that such a requirement "seems unbefitting the district court be-
low, or any court in this state." Id. at 660.
35 Cox's Food Center, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 1653, 420 P.2d 645 (Idaho 1966).
See note 17 supra.
1 275 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
2 Then known as the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks.
.	 8 This contention seems untenable in view of the fact that the NMB construes an
election in which fewer than a majority of employees participate as a vote against any
representation, since there is no space on the ballot for marking "no union." See Brother-
hood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Association for the Benefit of Non-Contract Employees, 380
U.S. 650, 668-71 (1965). If a majority of the eligible employees vote for some representa-
tive, a majority of those voting will decide the issue. See Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n
No: 40, 300 U.S. 515, 559-61 (1937)..
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